The culmination of months of tension between President Mohamed Bazoum and his chief guard drove the coup in Niger. Individuals familiar with the situation stated that this friction stemmed from Bazoum’s attempts to escape the shadow of his predecessor.
Since assuming office in 2021, succeeding his political mentor Mahamadou Issoufou, Bazoum aimed to assert his dominance over the West African nation. This endeavor involved sidelining influential figures in both the military and public administration. However, this assertiveness eventually led to his downfall.
General Abdourahamane Tiani, the head of the influential presidential guard, sensed the possibility of his own sidelining and subsequently turned against Bazoum. Tiani believed that other military commanders would eventually align with his cause. This account of the coup’s unfolding is drawn from insights gleaned from 15 interviews conducted with Nigerien security officials, politicians, as well as current and former Western government officials.
Neither Tiani nor Bazoum could be reached for comment. In his first statement following the July 26 coup, Tiani claimed to have removed the president for the nation’s benefit.
After ascending to power, Bazoum bolstered military cooperation with France and the United States, restricted the autonomy of Nigerien army commanders, and initiated anti-corruption campaigns targeting associates of Issoufou, notably within the oil sector. This approach led to the formation of adversaries.
Tiani, who had served as the head of Issoufou’s guard for a decade and played a role in foiling a coup shortly before Bazoum’s rise to power, continued in his role under the new president. He commanded Niamey’s most formidable and well-equipped force.
However, in recent months, Bazoum reduced the size of the presidential guard, which consisted of about 700 members during the coup. Additionally, he began scrutinizing the guard’s budget.
Eager to secure his position, Tiani, a figure who had risen through the ranks and been bestowed the rank of general by Issoufou, discreetly discussed his coup plans with select commanders. This was an effort to ensure that other military branches would not resist him, as per individuals familiar with the coup plotter’s thinking.
Reuters could not ascertain which commanders were briefed by Tiani.
Moreover, Tiani strategically waited until a substantial number of troops had been dispatched from Niamey to Diffa, a remote location 20 hours away in southeastern Niger. This move coincided with the Independence Day celebrations slated for August 3, according to information from two sources.
Collision Course
On July 27, a day after Tiani’s presidential guard detained Bazoum at his residence, Niger’s army command announced its support for the coup, aiming to avoid a potentially lethal conflict between different factions.
Spokespersons for the junta and the army command did not respond to messages seeking comment.
However, the ongoing internal resistance to Tiani assuming the role of head of state dwindled. Yet, the new administration of the country is still heading for a confrontation with the 15-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
This marks the fifth coup in Niger within the last 50 years and deals a blow to former colonial power France and the United States. These nations maintain over 2,000 troops in the country, utilizing it as a base for counteracting jihadists in the expansive and unstable Sahel region.
This coup follows military takeovers in neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso over the past three years, which prompted France to withdraw thousands of troops. This move allowed Russia to increase its influence in the region.
It remains unclear from the Reuters interviews whether Tiani had discussed his plans with Issoufou, a towering political figure in West Africa who wields significant sway in Niger.
Issoufou was elected in 2011, a year following a previous military coup. He garnered praise for voluntarily stepping down in 2021 after two terms, facilitating the first democratic transition to a new leader in Niger since independence.
Speculation circulated in the capital after the coup, as Issoufou remained silent for several days, suggesting he might have been aware of Tiani’s intentions.
Issoufou had grown increasingly frustrated with Bazoum’s attempts to chart his own course, according to individuals familiar with the matter. Two allies of Issoufou recalled hearing him voice dissatisfaction with Bazoum’s reluctance to heed his advice on governing the country, particularly in the oil sector.
Reuters was unable to reach Issoufou for comment. A person close to the former president stated that he initially refrained from publicly discussing the rebellion due to his efforts to mediate between Tiani and Bazoum.
This individual, who chose not to be identified, denied any involvement of Issoufou in the coup. They pointed to the junta’s decision to apprehend his son, the oil and energy minister, on July 31, as evidence that the former president did not collude with Tiani.
On July 30, four days into the coup, Issoufou broke his silence. He used social media to indicate his involvement in mediation efforts and called for Bazoum’s reinstatement.
Issoufou has since provided no further information about his activities.
Safe Room
July 26 commenced as a routine day for Bazoum. He began with breakfast at his residence, situated within the compound of the presidential guard in central Niamey. According to various current and former Western officials who spoke with the president by phone afterward, Bazoum was preparing to proceed to his nearby office when he sensed something amiss: Tiani’s soldiers had encircled his home. Responding to this situation, the president promptly retreated to the residence’s secure room, equipped with confidential communications.
After several hours passed without any signs of rescue, Bazoum rejoined his family in the main part of the residence, which remained besieged.
Following the detention of Bazoum, Tiani instructed General Salifou Mody, who had previously been stripped of his role as chief of staff of the Niger Armed Forces by the president in April, to liaise with other branches of the security services and secure their support. This directive was relayed by four sources familiar with the matter.
Mody, designated as Niger’s representative to the United Arab Emirates in June—an assignment widely perceived as a demotion—nevertheless remained in Niger and did not undertake the new role. It is unclear whether Mody, listed as a deputy to Tiani in the junta’s organizational chart, was one of the few commanders briefed before the coup. Reuters was unable to reach Mody for comment.
Simultaneously, as news of the coup circulated within Niamey, former president Issoufou contacted Tiani. He extended an offer to mediate, as shared by two sources familiar with the situation. Subsequently, Issoufou met with Bazoum, sharing his assessment that Tiani had succumbed to a “mood swing,” a condition he believed he could help resolve, according to a person close to Issoufou.
As the events unfolded, with Niger’s prime minister absent from the country, Foreign Minister Hassoumi Massaoudou took the lead in attempting to secure Bazoum’s release, according to individuals with knowledge of the matter. Massaoudou did not respond to messages seeking comment.
Around midday on July 26, a social media post from an account linked to the Nigerien presidency assured the public that Bazoum and his family were safe. The post conveyed that the army and national guard were prepared to confront the rebellious soldiers if they did not stand down.
Subsequently, hundreds of Bazoum’s supporters gathered at a central square in Niamey, later marching towards the presidential palace. These demonstrators called for the mutineers to release the president and return to their barracks.
Later that day, National Guard troops assumed positions around the compound where Bazoum was held. However, at approximately 9 p.m., the mutineers broadcasted a video on state television. A little-known colonel, Amadou Abdramane, clad in a blue military jacket and flanked by nine officers, announced that Bazoum had been ousted from power. The video also declared the suspension of all institutions of the republic and the closure of Niger’s borders.
The group comprised members from nearly all branches of Niger’s security apparatus, including the police, army, air force, and presidential guard. Ahmad Sidien, second-in-command of the National Guard, was also present.
On the subsequent day, the Nigerien military command declared support for the junta, and the National Guard lifted its siege of the presidential guard compound—aligning with Tiani’s intended outcome.
Tiani, who chose to remain discreet until he garnered public support from other commanders, as per two sources knowledgeable about the plot, made a television appearance on July 28. In his brief statement, he attributed the junta’s motivations to safeguarding the homeland. He attributed the coup to Niger’s government’s failure to address security concerns.
However, with ECOWAS threatening potential military intervention if the coup isn’t reversed by Sunday, Tiani could soon confront an entirely different challenge.
Reported by Moussa Aksar in Niamey, David Lewis in Nairobi, and David Gauthier-Villars in Istanbul. Additional contributions by Michel Rose in Paris and Edward McAllister in Dakar. Edited by Alexandra Zavis and David Clarke.
